The paper reviews the recent conduct of monetary policy and the central bank's rule-based behavior in Russia. Using different policy rules, we test whether the central bank in Russia reacts to changes in inflation, output gap and the exchange rate in a consistent and predictable manner. Our results indicate that during the period of 1993-2002 the Bank of Russia has used monetary aggregates as a main policy instrument in conducting monetary policy.
Introduction
The last ten years have witnessed an upsurge in research on monetary policy rule evaluation motivated by the seminal paper of Taylor (Taylor, 1993) .
Following this study, a great number of researchers have investigated the Federal Reserve's (the US Central Bank) behavior using either a simple Taylor rule or some simple variations thereof, like including lags of short-term interest rate or output deviations. Overall, for the US or other developed countries, the Taylor rule explains rather well the behavior of central banks. Most of the time they stabilize deviations either from a target level inflation or output gap, using an interest rate instrument.
However, in the case of developing countries and emerging markets, the findings of monetary policy rule evaluations are somewhat inconsistent, with results changing, depending upon time span and model specification (Mohanty and Klau, 2003) . This can be explained by several facts: given the specific nature of markets in emerging economies, the adequate policy instrument could not only be the short-term interest rate, but also the monetary base (a McCallum rule) or the exchange rate (a Ball rule). Additionally, the inclusion of the exchange rate in the central bank's reaction function does not contradict the objectives of central banks, if exchange rate stabilization is a precondition for both output stabilization and bringing down inflation to a targeted level (Taylor 2000) .
Over the past few years a number of studies have investigated monetary policy rules in emerging markets, finding that even with some shortcomings, central banks in emerging markets follow also some rule-based monetary policy,
and that an open-economy version of the Taylor rule can describe much of the variation in short-term interest rates (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003 , Minella et al., 2003 , Mohanty and Klau, 2003 , Taylor 2002 and Torres Garcia, 2003 .
It is, however, not clear whether this applies to transition economies, where financial markets are even less developed and where the implementation of a money-based monetary policy may face institutional problems. Because of even greater model specification difficulties and problems associated with collecting reliable data, very little research has been done on monetary policy rules in transitional economies. This study is one of the first attempts to fill this gap, as it examines the conduct of monetary policy in Russia during the period of [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The empirical estimation of alternative rules for monetary policy allows a test of the statement that in financially less developed economies, monetary targeting rules can provide an effective description of the behavior of the monetary authorities -and, in the case of Russia, of its stated objectives (see Taylor, 2000) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the monetary policy instruments and the monetary regime followed by the Russian central bank in a chronological order. Section 3 specifies different empirical models to be used in evaluating monetary policy rules, while Section 4 presents the results of our empirical estimations. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions.
Development of Monetary Policy in Russia
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not immediately lead to the establishment of a truly Russian monetary authority (the Bank of Russia, or CBR), capable of conducting an independent and effective monetary policy, 2 as, until mid 1993, some of the former republics of the Soviet Union still used the rouble, the Russian national currency, and central banks of those republics conducted their own credit policy simultaneously with the Bank of Russia. Only after 1993 the Bank of Russia started to conduct its own independent monetary policy, although the scope of the policy was limited by the need to finance a huge budget deficit, mainly caused by a dramatic decline in output (see Figure   1 ). This loose monetary stance continued until the mid of 1995, when the Russian economy started showing signs of stabilization and a new law on the 2 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) was founded on 13 July 1990, based on the Russian Republic Bank of the State Bank of the Soviet Union. On 2 December 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed the Law "On the Central Bank of the RSFSR (Bank of Russia)", which declared the Bank of Russia a legal entity and the main bank of the Russian Federation.
Bank of Russia was passed, providing some degree of legal independence to the Bank of Russia in conducting monetary policy. 3 These positive developments allowed the Bank of Russia to adopt a tighter monetary policy and to introduce a pegged exchange rate regime with a crawling band against the US dollar, from July 1995 onwards. As a result of these measures inflation slowed down (see Figure 2) . Furthermore, because of favorable developments in the local securities market, direct credit to the government significantly decreased and the Bank of Russia started to conduct monetary policy through indirect instruments, such as interest rates and reserve requirements. However, the start of the Asian crisis of 1997 spread a negative shock throughout emerging markets. This external shock decreased investment confidence in Russia and caused capital outflows, forcing the Bank of Russia to defend the band. Although during the exchange market interventions in November 1997 the Bank of Russia lost over $6 billion of its liquid reserves, which was equal to two thirds of total reserves at that time, the exchange band was successfully defended for a while.
Despite these efforts of the Bank of Russia, due to the severe financial crisis of August 1998, the government was forced to default its domestic debt 3 Nevertheless, still today the Bank of Russia maintains some functions not traditionally seen as belonging to a central bank: for instance, in spite of being a banking supervisor and regulator, the CBR has a majority stake in the largest Russian bank (and state owned bank), Sberbank Rossii, which has 23 percent of all banking assets, 70 percent of household deposits, 20 percent of corporate deposits and 21,000 branches across Russia, and, until late 2002, also had participation in the second largest state owned bank, the VTB. Further, acting as an agent for the Ministry of Finance, it set up and manages the government securities market, known as the GKO market.
obligations. The rouble was devalued and the exchange rate band was abandoned, leading to the adoption of a "dirty" floating regime (see Figure 3, where a de facto targeting of the nominal exchange rate after 1998 seems apparent). 4 One consequence of the sharp depreciation was a rapid acceleration in inflation. Although rouble-denominated debt was restructured, investor confidence kept declining because of an increase in political uncertainty and private capital outflows. In such a situation, the Bank of Russia, fulfilling its role as a lender of last resort, attempted to preserve the payment system, which came to a halt during this period, by injecting liquidity into banking system through a reduction of reserve requirements and extending large amount of new credits.
However, base money declined significantly in real terms, reflecting the sharp decline in output and increased use of non-monetary forms of payment. Russia. The effects of these developments on the (real) exchange rate caused it to become one of the main targets of monetary policy (see Figure 3 ).
According to the Bank of Russia, the main objective of its monetary policy in 2000 was to reduce inflation to 18 percent and to achieve an annual growth rate of GDP of 1.5 percent. However, the continuing strength of the balance of payments and the Bank of Russia's reluctance to permit a real appreciation of the rouble has placed increasing pressure on monetary policy.
Given this continued favorable economic situation in recent years, the Bank of Russia has placed more weight on the exchange rate stability, while accepting the inflationary consequences of such a decision. This policy of the Bank of Russia has slowed the real appreciation of the rouble and reduced inflation, even though the pace of disinflation has been slower than the one formally targeted by the authorities. 6
Specification of the Empirical Model
As described above, since 1991 the Russian economy has experienced both sharp fluctuations in main macroeconomic variables and deep structural changes. Given this unstable nature of the economic environment in Russia, the task of estimating a monetary policy rule is complicated and no single policy 6 The policy relevance of such concerns with real appreciation are somewhat doubtful, as is unclear if the real exchange rate of the Russian rouble is above its long run equilibrium value, or merely recovering from an undershooting (see IMF, 2003 Originally, both rules were designed to be used in the evaluation of the monetary policy in large industrial countries, and many observers expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of this basic policy rules in evaluating the conduct of monetary policy in emerging economies. This concern raises the question as to what kind of modifications are needed to fit better the realities of emerging economies, with underdeveloped financial markets, dependence on 7 Razzak (2001) shows that the McCallum and Taylor rules are, as one should expect, cointegrated. 8 Perhaps the most traditional of those quasi "monetary targeters" was the German central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank (more precisely, the Bundesbank announced M3 as an intermediate target -"Zwischenziel", it did not use it as an instrument or operational target). Several works (see, for instance, Clarida and Gertler, 1996) 
Taylor rule
In his seminal work, Taylor (1993) proposed the following, now well known, policy rule to describe the Fed's behavior in setting the short term interest rates:
where i is the short term interest rate, π is the inflation over the four previous quarters, y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target (or "output gap").
The inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate are set at 2.0 and assumed as constant over time. The "policy maker" is here assumed to care, with equal weights, about deviation of inflation and output from target. In this formulation Taylor used a linear trend to approximate potential output. 
11 The HP filter is the usual method to "smooth-out" the estimate of the long-term trend component of a series. It is a two-sided linear filter that computes a smoothed series, denoted by os, of an original series, denoted by y hp below, by minimizing the variance of y around os, subject to a "penalty parameter" that constrains the second difference of os. That is, the HP filter chooses os t as to minimize
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series. The larger the λ used, the smoother the series os t will be. The HP filter has known limitations on short samples and also on its estimated end sample. It is widely accepted that the time series data usually suffer some level of autocorrelation, and if it is not corrected the estimation results cannot be treated as reliable. To correct for the autocorrelation problems, we will use differences rather than levels and add several lags, according to information criteria and statistical significances of the coefficients. exchange rate, and real effective exchange rate), the labor share as a proxy for the output gap, and the budget deficit. We use output numbers from RECEP and WIIW (industrial production numbers) and deflated them by the monthly consumer price inflation, due to the lack of a monthly GDP deflator. 13 For instance, Åslund (2001) estimates that, for an official figure of just 60.2 percent of the Russian 1989 GDP in 1995, the actual figure after taking into account, among other things, illegal and under-reported activities, was an amazing 94 percent, or, in other terms, a mere marginal GDP loss.
Empirical results

Data and Methodology
Results for the Taylor Rule
When we estimate an open economy version of the Taylor rule -in levels and in differences, the estimated coefficient of inflation is only significant in one specification (see Table 1 ). The estimated coefficient of the output gap does not show the expected sign and is insignificant (other proxies of the output gap such as the real unit labor cost suggested by Gali and Gertler (1999) This unsatisfactory result of the output gap might be caused by the facts that the objective of the Bank of Russia was limited to inflation and exchange rate stabilization or that the real time data significantly differed from the expost-data so that we get a biased picture in our estimations (see e.g. Orphanides, 2001) . Assuming that the Bank of Russia was indeed concerned with the output stabilization during this period, we built a real-time series to correct this bias in data. We used the yearly output data published in the annual reports of the Bank of Russia, 14 and on the basis of them constructed a monthly series, interpolating and re-basing the available industrial production monthly series from the WIIW.
When we run regressions using this "real-time" output gap, its estimated coefficients are always non-significant and no substantial changes are observed in the regressions (we do not present those results).
Overall, the estimation results suggest that a simple Taylor rule and its modifications do not describe well interest rate setting behavior of the Bank of Russia.
Results for the McCallum Rule
Because of data availability problems for the M1 series, some missing points have been recovered by using the M2 series, since these two series are highly correlated (over 95 percent). 15 We deflated the approximated monetary 14 For differences between the original WIIW series and the "real-time" series, see Graph 1 in the Appendix. 15 The monetary base has is also highly correlated with M1 -89 percent-and its use does not change the results.
aggregates series with the monthly consumer price index. We expect that the signs of the estimated coefficients will be reversed, as a decrease in M1 means a monetary contraction and a decrease in the interest rate a monetary expansion.
The estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating a poor performance of the original McCallum rule as specified in equation (3).
Moreover, this regression specification has another statistical disadvantage, as it requires discarding a large number of observations in order to average the velocity of money over the four-year period. Because of this drawback, we decided to estimate a modified McCallum rule, where the interest rate instrument (of a Taylor type rule) is substituted by a deflated monetary aggregate. When we run regressions using the forward interpolated "real-time" output gap, the estimated coefficients show always the expected signs and are statistically significant for the period from 1994 -2002 16 (see Table 2 ). 17
Overall, the estimation results allow us to conclude that the Bank of Russia has been targeting monetary aggregates in its policy decisions. At times of high inflation pressure, or a positive output gap calculated on the basis of the constructed real-time data, the Bank of Russia responded by reducing monetary 17 We can further improve our model by adding a new variable, the growth rate of the Bank of Russia's foreign assets (i.e. reserves), to the regression equation (however, in this case we have data only from the mid of 1995: for this reason, we do not show the results). Depending on the regression specifications the magnitude of the estimated coefficient ranges from 0.16 to 0.19 and is highly significant. Moreover, with this specification we obtained improved results for the adjusted R 2 , it increased from 0.76 to 0.81 for the same sample period.
aggregates in real terms, while at times of exchange rate appreciation the policy response was an expansionary monetary policy. Moreover, these results are not sensitive to the model specification and there are no major statistical problems.
Testing responses during different time periods
The Russian economy has experienced different shocks during different time periods, and it would be insightful to see whether the Bank of Russia has responded differently in different periods. Since the "money based" model performs best in the previous estimations, we will test it for different time periods. 18 First of all, we separate the period before and after 1995, as Chow breakpoint tests indicate a structural break at this time (but, peculiarly, not in August 1998). We use for this purpose the equation ("full model", see Table 2) of the following type: We obtain a similar result when we use a dummy variable for the crawling peg period, from October 1994 through August 1998. As one would expect, the commitment to react to changes in the exchange rate was greater during that period. During the high inflation period, the Bank of Russia attached a greater priority to inflation, while at times of relatively low inflation the main concern was exchange rate stabilization. Nevertheless, this is in sharp contrast with the recent experience of other advanced emerging markets, were interest rate rules produce a good description of the policy setting behavior of the monetary authority (see, for instance, Mohanty and Klau, 2003 , Minella et al., 2003 , Torres Garcia, 2003 . The 20 As a sign of this, Taylor rule regressions run only for the period after 2000, do show the expected signs for the variables, but most of them are non-significant (also, one must caution that this is a very short period and that the number of observations is therefore very limited). -1) In this model the refinancing rate in differences is the dependent variable. Inflation rates and the lagged interest rate are used in differences too.
Concluding Remarks
-Standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks indicate levels of significance a 10 (*), 5(**) or 1 (***) percent level. No rejection Notes: -The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM-test (with no autocorrelation as a null hypothesis) was conducted for twelve lags.
-(-1) indicates a first lag -The effective sample period is 1993:3 -2002:12 since we lose two months because of lags and differences. -1) In this case we deduct the HP-trend from quarter-to-quarter inflation and the growth in the dollar exchange rate.
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